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The  extraction  of  ﬁnancial  proﬁts  directly  out  of  personal  income 
constitutes ﬁnancial expropriation. Combined with investment banking, 







fully‐ﬂedged crisis of ﬁnancialised  capitalism.  The crisis did not  spring  directly out of a 
malaise of production, though it has already caused major disruption of accumulation. It 
was  precipitated  by  housing  debts  among  the  poorest  US  workers,  an  unprecedented 


















functionaries of ﬁnance, such as lawyers, accountants,  and technical  analysts.  This trend 










  Financialisation  has  also  deepened  the  complexity  of  imperialism.  Developing 
countries have been  forced to  hold vast  international  reserves that  have resulted in  net 
lending by the poor to the rich. Private capital has ﬂown into developing countries earning 
high  returns,  but  was  more  than  matched  by  reverse  ﬂows  to  accumulate  reserves  by 






of  greed  have  been  released  by  the  transformation  of  housing  and  pensions  into 
‘investments’, dragging individuals into ﬁnancial bubbles. To  be sure, there has also  been 
resistance and search for social alternatives. But ﬁnance has set the terms across the world. 
  This  paper  is  a  step  toward  analysis  of  ﬁnancialisation  and  its  attendant  crises. 
Guidance  has  been  sought  in  the  work  of  Marx  and  the  classical  Marxist  debates  on 
imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century. The paper starts with a brief discussion of 
the  US  ﬁnancial  bubble  and  its  burst  in  section  2.  It  is  shown  that  this  was  an 
Costas Lapavitsas ‐ Financialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial Expropriation                                                                                4unprecedented event, caused by the ﬁnancialisation of personal income combined with the 
rise of investment  banking.  To  obtain a  better  understanding  of the roots  of the crisis, 





for  commercial  banks.  Several  of  the  largest  have  eﬀectively  become  bankrupt,  thus 
crippling real accumulation. The focus of analysis is on the USA as the original site of the 



















2001 2215 60.7 160 96 60.0 355
2002 2885 63.0 200 122 61.0 679
2003 3945 67.5 310 203 65.5 1034
2004 2920 62.6 530 401 79.8 1464
2005 3120 67.7 625 508 81.3 1490




on  signiﬁcant  income.  When  this  demand  was  sated,  subprime  mortgage  lending  rose 
rapidly  (particularly  during  2004‐6)  amounting  to  $1.75tr,  or  19.5%  of  originations. 












of  investment  banking,  particularly  through  mortgage  securitisation:  $1.4tr  of  subprime 
mortgages were securitised during 2004‐2006, or 79.3% of the total. This was considerably 
higher than the average securitisation rate of 63.9% for the whole of originations. Simply 
put,  securitisation  involved  parcelling  mortgages  into  small  amounts,  placing  them  into 
larger  composites,  and  selling  the  lots  as  new  securities.  Particles  of  subprime  debt, 
therefore, became embedded in securities held by ﬁnancial institutions across the world.  





Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Originations ($tr) 1.1 2.2 2.9 3.8 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.3
Refinance (%) 20.5 57.2 61.6 66.4 52.8 52.0 48.6 49.8
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association; Mortgage Origination Estimates, updated 
March 24, 2008.
A  parallel  result  was  collapse  of  personal  savings,  which  approached  zero  as 
percentage of disposable income (table 3). The decline in personal  savings is a long‐term 
aspect  of  ﬁnancialisation,  reﬂecting  the  increasing  involvement  of  individuals  in  the 





Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Savings ($bn) 168.5 132.3 184.7 174.9 181.7 44.6 38.8 42.7
Savings as
% of Disposable 
Income
2.3 1.8 2.4 2.1 2.1 0.5 0.4 0.4
Source: Federal Reserve Bank, Flow of Funds, various.
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007







Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
USA -4.2 -5.1 -5.5 -6.0 -5.9 -5.1
UK -1.6 -1.3 -1.6 -2.5 -3.9 -4.9
Germany 2.0 1.9 4.3 4.6 5.0 5.6
Japan 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.8
Developing
Asia




6.4 6.3 8.3 8.6 7.4 4.5
Middle East 4.8 8.3 11.8 19.7 20.9 19.8








Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total
             of 
which:
800.9 895.8 1072.6 1395.3 1848.3 2339.3 3095.5 4283.4
China 168.9 216.3 292.0 409.0 615.5 822.5 1069.5 1531.4
Russia 24.8 33.1 44.6 73.8 121.5 156.5 296.2 445.3
India 38.4 46.4 68.2 99.5 127.2 132.5 171.3 256.8
M i d d l e 
East
























of  investment  banking.  The  tension  between  liquidity  and  solvency  became  severe  for 






banks  held  large  volumes  of  mortgage‐backed  securities,  or  were  obliged  to  support 
ﬁnancial  institutions  that held  them.  As mortgage failures  rose,  these securities  became 
progressively unsaleable, thus also putting bank solvency in doubt. Banks preferred to hoard 
liquid funds instead of lending them to others. 
Liquidity  shortages  can  be  captured  as  the  divergence  between  the three  month 
LIBOR (interbank  lending)  and the three‐month Overnight Indexed  Swap rate (risk‐free 
rate key to trading ﬁnancial derivatives among banks). These are normally very close to each 
other, but after August 2007 they diverged signiﬁcantly, the LIBOR exceeding OIS by 1% and 
even  more in  late 2007 and early 2008. 5  But this was as nothing  compared to  the size 
reached by the spread in September/October 2008.
The  burst  of  the  bubble  thus  led  to  an  apparent  paradox,  much  exercising  the 





but  there  was  shortage of  liquid  means  to  settle  obligations  ‐  i.e.  money  ‐  because  of 
hoarding by ﬁnancial institutions.  
2.4 Bank solvency and state intervention
Central  banks  have  led state  eﬀorts  to  confront  the persistent  liquidity  shortage. 
Extraordinary methods have been used by the Fed and other central banks, including Open 
Market  Operations,  discount  window lending, Term  Auction  Facilities, direct  lending  to 





But  liquidity  injections  alone  were  incapable  of  dealing  with  the  aggravated 
malfunctioning of ﬁnancialised income and investment banking. The crisis went  through 
two  peaks in 2008  resulting from  the tension between  liquidity and solvency, while also 
showing the limits of state intervention. The ﬁrst was the collapse of Bear Sterns in March, a 


















The  second  peak  occurred in September‐October 2008,  a period that  has  already 
found its place in the annals of capitalist banking. Rising defaults in the US housing market 
led  to  the  near  collapse of Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie Mac.  These  government‐sponsored 
agencies partake of roughly half the annual transactions of mortgage‐backed securities in 
the USA, and typically buy only prime quality. But during the bubble they engaged in riskier 







holds for  one,  holds  for all. Since  Bear  Sterns’  creditors received their money  back  but 
Lehman Brothers’ did not, the grounds for interbank lending vanished. Worse, the collapse 
of  Lehman  conﬁrmed  beyond  doubt  that  combining  investment  banking  with  the 
ﬁnancialisation of personal income had failed irretrievably. Lehman might have been very 
aggressive, but it had done nothing qualitatively diﬀerent from other banks.
The  aftermath  of  the  Lehman  shock  was  not  surprising,  but  its  magnitude  was 
historic. Liquidity disappeared completely, bank shares collapsed and genuine panic spread 














output  and  employment.  Consumption  declined  as  worried  and  over‐indebted  workers 
rearranged their expenditure. Export markets collapsed, particularly  for automobiles and 
consumer  electronics.  Developing  countries  also  suﬀered  as  capital  ﬂows  became 
problematic,  necessitating  emergency  borrowing.  A  crisis  that  had  began  as  a  ﬁnancial 
shock had mutated into a global recession. 
To recap, a fully‐ﬂedged crisis of ﬁnancialisation commenced in 2007. Unlike major 
capitalist  crises  of  the  past,  it  arose  due  to  the  ﬁnancialisation  of  personal  income, 
particularly mortgage lending to US workers, even the poorest. This was combined with the 
spread  of  investment  banking  practices  among  ﬁnancial  institutions,  above  all, 
securitisation.  The  crisis paralysed  the ﬁnancial  system  and  progressively disrupted real 





10specifying  the  content  of  ﬁnancialisation.  To  engage  in  this  analysis  Marxist  political 
economy needs to develop its concepts and broaden its approach. The preceding discussion 
has shown that the crisis did not emerge because of over‐accumulation of capital, though it 






Financialisation has  resulted from  the  epochal  changes that  followed  the ﬁrst oil 
shock of 1973‐4. That crisis signalled the end of the long post‐war boom and ushered in a 
long downturn punctuated by repeated economic crises. 8 During this period there has been 
a  technological  revolution  in  information  processing  and  telecommunications,  with  a 
pronounced eﬀect on the sphere of circulation. 9 Furthermore, during the same period there 






productivity  growth  for  two  decades.  After  1995  there  were  signiﬁcant  gains  in  the 
microprocessor industry and eventually a broad  basis was created for faster productivity 
growth across the US economy. 12 Productivity growth picked up even in the services sector, 
























has been  intensiﬁed,  and unpaid labour  stretched.  From  the extensive literature on job 
satisfaction,  for  instance,  it  transpires  that  work  intensiﬁcation  associated  with  new 
technology is a key reason for dissatisfaction with work in developed countries,  together 
with loss of discretion over work choices. 15
Third,  global  production  and  trade  have come to  be dominated by multinational 
enterprises  created  through  successive  waves  of  mergers  and  acquisitions.  The  bulk  of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) takes place among developed countries, but there were also 
substantial ﬂows to developing countries since the mid‐1990s, rising signiﬁcantly after 2000. 




and  Japan  continue  to  earn  large  manufacturing  surpluses.  Nonetheless,  in  the  West, 
typically in the USA and the UK, there has been a general shift of capitalist activity toward 
ﬁnancial and other services.


































  Put  in  Marxist  terms,  monopolies  have  become  less  reliant  on  banking  credit  to 
ﬁnance ﬁxed capital. Circulating capital, on the other hand, continues to draw on trade and 
banking credit. Even there, however, monopolies have gained direct recourse to ﬁnancial 
markets,  particularly  by issuing  commercial  paper.  Monopolies,  therefore,  have  become 
increasingly implicated in ﬁnance, even to the extent of maintaining separate departments 
for  operations  in  trade  credit  and  ﬁnancial  securities.  In  short  they  have  become 
ﬁnancialised, while relying less on banks.  
  The deeper reasons for this fundamental development are probably associated with 





distance  between  large  corporations  and  banks.  Large  corporations  have  boosted  open 
ﬁnancial  markets, actively by‐passing controls over interest rates and quantities of credit, 
thus preparing the ground for deregulation. Once deregulation occurred, commercial banks 


















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
                                                                                                            
                               
 Source: Financial Accounts for Germany
This  fundamental  trend  presupposes  increasing  involvement  of  workers with  the 
mechanisms  of ﬁnance in  order to  meet  elementary  needs,  such as  housing,  education, 
health,  and  provision  for old  age.  Only then  would banks  be  able  to  extract signiﬁcant 
proﬁts directly from  wages  and  salaries.  Once again,  there are major diﬀerences among 
developed countries in this respect, reﬂecting history, institutions, and plain custom. Still, 
the  increasing  ‘ﬁnancialisation’  of  individual  worker  income  is  clear,  in  terms  both  of 
liabilities (mostly borrowing for housing) and assets (mostly pensions and insurance): 
  
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
                                                                               





   
   
   
   
    
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
                                                                          
                    
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts of the USA, Financial Accounts for Germany, OECD
  Widespread  implication  of workers  in  the  mechanisms  of ﬁnance is the  basis  of 
ﬁnancial  expropriation. However, the proportion of worker income that accrues to banks 







systematically  in  production  and  remains  the  cornerstone  of  contemporary  capitalist 
economies. Financial expropriation is an additional source of proﬁt that originates in the 
sphere of circulation. In so far as it relates to personal income, it involves existing ﬂows of 


















deal  with  individuals  diﬀerently  from  capitalist  enterprises.  The  latter  have  reasonable 
access to information and are not inferior to ﬁnancial institutions in social and economic 
power. The ﬁnancial services they obtain are necessary for the production and circulation of 
value  and  surplus  value.  Charges  for  these services  generally  fall  within  limits  that  are 
determined in every period by the availability of loanable capital and the proﬁtability of real 
accumulation. If it were otherwise, capitalist enterprises could in principle bypass existing 








use values,  while  enterprises  aim  at  the expansion of value. Consequently, the ﬁnancial 
actions  of  individuals  are  driven  by diﬀerent  objectives,  motives,  information,  access  to 
alternatives,  and  ability  to  ‘economise’  compared  to  enterprises.  Moreover,  individual 
workers and others  who  seek  to  meet  basic needs through  ﬁnance ‐  particularly  in  the 
context  of  limited  social  provision  –  have  few  options  in  by‐passing,  or  replacing,  the 
mechanisms  of  the  ﬁnancial  system.  Hence  individual  income  can  become  a target  for 
ﬁnancial expropriation. 
Proﬁt  from  ﬁnancial  expropriation  is  reminiscent  of  usurer’s  proﬁt.  The  latter 
typically  arises  as  production  becomes  commercialised,  thus  making  (non‐capitalist) 







                                                                                 
                                                                             
   
  
  
   
   
   
   
                                                               
  
   
  
   
  
   
  




ﬁnancial  institutions  diﬀer from  usurers.  But  in  times  of  crisis  the former  can  become 
usurious, extracting interest out of the capital of the borrower, rather than out of proﬁt. 22










allowed  them  to  tilt  transactions  to  their  own  beneﬁt.  Elements  of  supremacy  and 
subordination  are  present  in  these  relations,  though  there  is  no  direct  analogue  with 
exploitation  in  production. 23     Still,  ﬁnancial  expropriation  draws  on  a  fundamental 
inequality between ﬁnancial institutions and working people accessing ﬁnance. 
4.2 Banks turn to ﬁnancial market mediation: The advance of investment banking
The  growth  of  open  ﬁnancial  markets,  involving  primarily  shares,  bonds  and 
derivatives,  has presented banks with further opportunities for proﬁt making.  Share and 
bond prices result from discounting future payments, using the rate of interest (adjusted for 
risk)  as benchmark. 24  Marx called this process the formation of ‘ﬁctitious capital’,  thus 























framework  of  commercial  banks,  including  deposit  insurance  and  capital  adequacy. 


















takes place on  the basis  of ﬁctitious prices,  it is susceptible to  sentiment, rumours, and 
manipulation.
Two  fundamental  trends  have  encouraged  the  adoption  of  investment  banking 
functions by commercial banks since the late 1970s. First, successive waves of mergers and 
acquisitions have taken place among ‘ﬁnancialised’  corporations. Stock  markets have not 






the  UK  through  Personal  Equity  Plans  (PEP),  Tax‐Exempt  Special  Savings  Accounts 






diﬀerence  in  liquidity  and  solvency  requirements  between  the  two  types  of  banking. 
Commercial  banks rely for liquidity on a mass of money‐like deposits,  while investment 









1981, ch. 7. But since the focus of this article is on banks, there is no need to consider it further.    Mixing  the two  types  of  banking could result  in  disaster,  particularly as deposit 
holders could  be scared into  withdrawing  their funds  from  commercial  banks that have 





has  its  roots  in  the  trends  outlined  above.  Commercial  banks  are  intermediaries  that 
essentially borrow short to lend long – they are heavily ‘leveraged’. Hence they need to keep 
some reasonably liquid assets to deal with deposit withdrawals; they must also maintain a 
steady  inﬂow  of  liquid  liabilities  to  ﬁnance  their  own  lending;  ﬁnally,  they  must  hold 
signiﬁcant own capital to take losses on lending and avoid default. These requirements are 
costly,  forcing  commercial  banks to  walk  a tightrope  between liquidity  and solvency. 32 
Financialisation profoundly disrupted this process. 
Consider ﬁrst the lending, or asset, side of banking. For commercial banks, engaging 
in  ﬁnancial  expropriation  means  primarily  mortgage  and  consumer  lending.  But  since 
mortgages  typically  have  long  duration,  heavy  preponderance  would  have  made  bank 
balance  sheets  insupportably  illiquid.  The  answer  was  securitisation,  i.e.  adoption  of 
investment  banking  techniques.  Mortgages were originated but not kept  on  the balance 







For  commercial  banks,  therefore,  the  adoption  of  investment  banking  practices 
turned lending (to earn interest) into mediating the circulation of securities (to earn fees). 
Securitisation  was  naturally  extended  to  other  assets,  such  as  credit  card  receivables, 
automobile loans, home equity loans, and so on. In this vein, independent investment banks 
created Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) by securitising a broad mix of underlying 
assets,  including  mortgages,  consumer credit,  regular  bonds,  and even  mortgage‐backed 
securities. Banks appeared to  have found a way of keeping the asset side of their balance 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securitisation.  By  engaging  in  investment  banking  practices,  commercial  banks  could 




widespread  solvency  problems  for banks.  As  mortgage‐backed  assets  became  worthless, 
independent US investment banks were rendered eﬀectively bankrupt in view of extremely 














Once  defaults  on  subprime  mortgages  started  in  full  earnest  in  2006,  securitised 
assets became very risky. They could not be easily sold, and their prices declined. For SIVs 
and hedge  funds  this  meant  that  their assets worsened  in  price  and quality,  making  it 
impossible to borrow in the money market. Confronted with bankruptcy they had to call on 




The  destructive  interplay  of liquidity and solvency led to  bankruptcy,  collapse of credit, 
shrinking demand, and emerging slump.
4.4. The mismanagement of risk, or what role for banks in ﬁnancialised capitalism?
The  disastrous  performance  of  banks  in  the  course  of the bubble poses  broader 
questions regarding their role in ﬁnancialised capitalism. The classics of Marxism thought 




keep appropriate  levels  of  capital.  Mainstream  economics  postulates  that  banks  acquire 











Banks  have also  begun to  estimate the  risk  of default  of  their assets by applying 










37 For standard analysis see Saunders and Allen 2002, pp. 84‐106, and Duﬃe and Singleton 2003, pp. 31‐42.On  this  basis,  banks  estimate  their  Daily  Earnings  at  Risk  (DEAR),  that  is,  the 
probability that the value of their assets would decline below a certain level on a daily basis. 
Consequently, they can readjust the mix of their assets to  bring  DEAR within acceptable 
bounds. To this purpose,  bank assets must  reﬂect current  market  valuations, rather than 
historical  prices.  For  this  reason,  the  accounting  practice  of  ‘marking  to  market’  has 
prevailed in the course of ﬁnancialisation.
Inference‐based computationally‐intensive  techniques  of  risk  management  appear 
‘hard’ and have a scientiﬁc air.  They also  ﬁt well  with the investment banking  functions 
acquired by commercial banks. 38 During the bubble it was universally claimed that banks 










advanced  on  the basis  of ‘credit  scoring’  and on  the  understanding that  they would be 
rapidly  securitised.  The  mortgage‐backed  securities  were  assessed  by  credit  rating 





and subsequent  securitisations.  Banks imagined that  they were shifting risk  onto  others 
through securitisation. In eﬀect they were simply giving a diﬀerent form to risk as loans to 
SIVs,  hedge  funds  and  so  on.  When  mortgage  defaults  started,  the  true  extent  of risk 
became apparent, and banks were ruined.
Put diﬀerently, the turn of banks toward ﬁnancial expropriation and ﬁnancial market 
mediation  has  resulted  in  loss  of  capacity  to  collect  information  and  assess  risk  on  a 
‘relational’ basis. Banks have acquired some of the character of the broker, while partially 
losing that of the ﬁnancial intermediary. This has created problems in assessing borrower 




























and  wealth  accruing  through  the  ﬁnancial  sector  and  have  contributed  to  the  rise  of 
inequality during this period. Is ﬁnancialisation a new era of the rentier and, if so, in what 
way?
Much  of  the  literature  on  ﬁnancialisation  assumes  (sometimes  tacitly)  that  the 











ﬁnancial  system  emerges  necessarily  out  of  real  accumulation.  Informed  by  German 
capitalism, he also had no truck with the notion that real accumulation runs into diﬃculties 
because idle rentiers constrain active industrialists. 
Underpinning Marxist  views  on  the  rentier  is  the concept  of interest‐bearing  (or 
loanable) capital. 47 However, there is some ambiguity in Marx’s analysis of the sources of 

















system  is  to  mobilise  idle  funds,  transforming  them  into  loanable  money  capital  and 
channelling them back to accumulation. Along these lines, Hilferding speciﬁes the sources 
of idle money as well as the complex ways in which it becomes loanable capital.50

























measure  of  rentier  income.  Financial  institutions  ‐  above all,  banks  ‐  are  not  parasites 
subsisting  on  the proﬁt  ﬂows of industrious  productive capitalists.  In principle they  are 
capitalist enterprises oﬀering necessary services in the sphere of circulation. They are thus 



















concept  of  ﬁnance  capital,  capturing  the epochal  change that  resulted  from  the altered 

















since ﬁnance was  strongly  regulated,  the  USA  subsumed  imperialist  divisions under its 
struggle against the Soviet Union, and a wave of liberation movements destroyed the old 
empires.  But  the rise of ﬁnancialisation appears  to  have  injected fresh life into  it.  Does 






‘ﬁnancialised’  personal  incomes  as  well  as  in  mediating  transactions  in  open  ﬁnancial 
markets. 
Second, the character of ﬁnancial systems has changed in ways incompatible with the 




weight  of open  ﬁnancial  markets  is greater,  while banks  and  industry  have arms‐length 
relations. In contrast, bank‐based systems have prominent credit systems and close relations 










based  as  ﬁnance  capital  emerges.  However,  the rise  of  open  ﬁnancial  markets,  and  the 
transformation of banks in  recent  decades are not consistent  with such a trend. On the 
contrary, there has been a global shift toward market‐based systems, drawing on the US 
model, though bank‐based systems have not disappeared by any means. 
Third,  for  both  Hilferding  and  Lenin  exclusive  trading  zones  are  vital  to  the 
emergence of territorial empires. But ﬁnancialised capitalism has not produced phenomena 
of  this  type,  instead  there  have  been  pressures  for  lower  tariﬀs  and  a  homogeneous 
institutional  framework  of  trading.  To  be  sure,  the  process  has  been  uneven  and 







deregulation.  For  another,  the state is  the power behind  the central  bank  both  through 








was shown  above  that  developing  countries  have  been  forced  to  accumulate enormous 
dollar reserves in recent years. This has beneﬁted primarily the USA since poor countries 
have supplied with loanable capital, thus allowing it to sustain substantial trade deﬁcits. But 




Industrial  and  commercial  capitals  are  able  to  borrow  in  open  ﬁnancial  markets,  thus 





current  crisis  represents  a  gigantic  concatenation  of  the  imbalances,  tensions  and 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